





33 
33 ■ 

S3, 









3>.3>3 



.3D 3':^ 



> ;^^» '-^ 



3> 33 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Ji 



yy -z 
3 3 ^:g> 






:'> 3^v. j^c 



;^ 






UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. :'L3||^ 






> :? 


>:> :> 


3- "!>. 


y^ > 


y ^ 


&- ' 


y 0- 


X2>; -3 



' 3^Q> 

' JO 

30)'- >J> ' 



'33l~ 



.;3> _ 

P31>:^. 
3.3 >_ 

3 •? 



■3';>' ■ 

> 3 
>o 

33 
3 3 s 
3 > 
3 3 
3 3 

i3 



^/i? 



-^ :> 3 :>3-^ 

y >• 3 > » z^-j». • 

) > 3 V3^ :^:J' 1 



) ; ) ' :x3 * :> 



• 3 3 

3'22> . 



■> ^ '. 


y? 


• -^ > 


: >> 


► 3 


■ >> 


l» .> 


^ J-.> 


3ii > 


> yj 


> > 


> 3 > 


> 3 


> 33 


^ > 


' >3 


3 > 


>' >_> 


^3 y 


>> 


y j> 


yy 






1 



>'^ 






3:- 









' '3 3 






' :2^»^:-^ 



> ) 
> :> 



3 31 






^3 



3"'^ 



>6. .>• 


J6>J» 


;^3 ■ 


■-fi 

D 


>5 










^ >^^ 


^.: .. 


"I^^ s;_r^^ 


■xiX 


'. _I^ ■ -'J^ 


>->::;■ 


ZJ^ '-Ij^ 


iXiIT^" 


:ZS» V'l^ - 


>^.1- V 


.-» -3^ ■ 


:> y^-r'' 


',:>"3) ^ 


y\>^'"."". 


■.Oi» ■3:> 


y~)":r 


:. :> .'3>- 


. y :> ■ "::: 


a.:> > 


>3 '* 


>:*::> . >.. 


y^h'^ 


:D*-3 ;>; ■ 


j>^ 


r-^'^^v^ 3 : 


.>3' 


""^'y'y^X 


-> > 


"^■':>.^> 


3.-^ 


':> ">':>~^- 


>l3 


■ 3^>".^.. 


» r".^^ 


> > 






THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 



AN ADDRESS 



DELIVERED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD 



ONE HUNDREDTH CELEBRATION 



BATTLE OF BEMIS HEIGHTS 



September 19, 1877 



/ 

JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS, \S^^^ 



NEW YORK 
ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH & COMPANY 

900 B ROADWAY 
1877. 




VW , V.V . vv 



£233 



THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 



Mr. Chairman, Citizens of Saratoga County, 

Ladies and Gentlemen : 

To appear before you on this interesting occasion, com- 
memorative of an important event in the annals of the State and 
country, is to me not only a signal honor and a grateful task 
but a filial duty. Proud to be chosen to recite the incidents 
of the campaign which culminated in the surrender of the first 
British army to the infant republic, it is a source of still 
greater pride to me that I am thus permitted to link my own 
name in the chain of history with that of my grandfather, 
Col. Ebenezer Stevens, of the Continental army, who, on this 
field, a century ago, directed, as Major Commandant of the 
Artillery of the Northern Department, the operations of that 
arm of the service which in great measure contributed to and 
secured the final success of the American troops. 

The ground on which we stand is memorable. Before the 
discovery of the continent, this territory, at whose southern 
angle we are now gathered, was the battle-field of the Indian 
tribes, whose war trails lay upon its boundaries, and from the 
days of European settlement it has been the debatable ground 
of the French and Dutch, the French and English, and the 
colonists and English, by turns. Here the fate of Ameri- 
can empire has been repeatedly sealed. Not because of its 
matchless beauty of hill and dale, its mirrored lakes and crys- 
tal streams, its invigorating atmosphere and perfect skies, 



4 SARATOGA — HISTORIC GROUND. 

nor yet because of its unmeasured forests and fertile fields, 
was this old territory of Saratoga and Kayaderosseras the 
object of rivalry and contention. Its possession was of 
supreme military importance. The Mohawk pours into the 
Hudson at its southernmost limit ; its borders are protected 
by their waters, while a series of declivities, descending from 
the mountain ranges of Luzerne and Kayaderosseras and ter- 
minating in groups of isolated hills, present an admirable 
strategic point. The discovery of Lake Champlain in 1609, 
by the brave Frenchman whose name it bears, and the sailing 
up the Hudson by Henry Hudson, the same year, gave rise to 
a contest for its possession between the Canadian and New 
York colonists which lasted for more than a century and a half. 

The French settlements spread rapidly up the St. Lawrence 
and far into the western country, while the Dutch and Eng- 
lish slowly and methodically pushed their way along the Hud- 
son, and thence by the Mohawk to the great interior lakes. 
From the mouth of the Mohawk, northward, skirting the 
shores of the Hudson and the lakes, lay the highway between 
the rival settlements and posts. In its route it passed the 
carrying-places of the Indians. Over this road, then but an 
Indian trail, the troops of Frontenac passed in 1693, on their 
way to strike the fortified villages of the Mohawk. Upon it 
Colonel Schuyler built the forts from Stillwater to Fort Ann, 
in the war of 1709. 

In the campaigns of 1744 and I755> the French and their 
Indian allies, with war-whoop, scalping-knife and tomahawk, 
swept down through the forests to the settlements of this 
region ; and in the seven years' war that followed, from 1755 to 
1763, it was by this road that Abercrombie led his troops to 
defeat and Amherst to the final triumph of the English arms ; 
and here again swept back and forth the tide of war in alter- 
nate ebb and flow during the earlier period of the American 
Revolution. 

In the beginning of the contest the spirit of the colonies 
was little understood in England. Notwithstanding the 
warning of the American agents, it was believed that the war 



INDEPENDENCE, A CERTAINITY. 5 

would be localized in Massachusetts, and that General Gage 
and a few regiments would easily reduce the rebellious col- 
ony. The uprising of the continent in reply to the guns at 
Lexington dispelled this illusion, and the British Ministry 
awakening to the magnitude of their undertaking, plans were 
laid for a continental campaign. 

Here a protest may be pardoned against the assumption of 
those who have doubted the ability of the colonies to main- 
tain the liberty they had asserted without the French inter- 
vention, which the victory of Saratoga secured to the Ameri- 
can cause. A careful examination of the letters and news- 
papers of the day, which, in the words of Webster, are the 
only true sources of historic information, will show that the 
colonists never doubted of their cause, and that they knew 
the reason of the faith that was in them. They were fully 
aware of the numbers they had contributed to the British 
forces in the Canadian conquest, and of the prowess they had 
displayed side by side with the best of the British regiments. 

They were also informed of the extreme difficulty with 
which the home Government obtained its recruits. Already 
in the middle of the last century, under the atrocious land 
system of England and the development of manufactures, 
the agricultural population, the yeomanry, hardy sons of 
the soil, which is the base of every great military state, had 
been fast disappearing. It was in 1770, before the Revolution, 
that Goldsmith, the poet of the people, breathed his lament 
over the happy days long past — 

" Ere England's grief began. 
When every rood of land maintained its man." 

The words of the poet were as familiar to Americans as to 
their English parents, and they had received -a striking con- 
firmation in the enlistment by the Ministry of Hessian mer- 
cenaries, whose appearance in the colonies, while exciting the 
indignation of the patriots, was positive proof of the unpopu- 
larity of the war in England and the weakness of the mother 
country. 



6 OCCUPATION OF CANADA. 

The earlier movements of the colonial leaders show that 
they were thoroughly acquainted with the art of war in its 
larger sense. They recognized the value of the great lines of 
water communication — the St. Lawrence and the Hudson — 
and foresaw that the first efforts of the British Ministry would 
be to control their mouths, from which, by their superior 
naval power, they could force the passages of the rivers and 
divide the territory. The Northern and Eastern people recog- 
nized this intuitively, and gave point and direction to the 
movement toward Canada by the seizure of Ticonderoga and 
Crown Point at the outset of hostilities. These important 
posts were surprised by the Eastern militia. Their artillery 
and stores were of priceless value to the Continental cause. 

The road to the St. Lawrence thus opened, and the temper 
of the Canadians and Indians of the lower provinces favoring 
the undertaking, it was resolved by Congress, in June, I775> to 
take possession of St. John and Montreal, and General Schuy- 
ler was intrusted with the command of the forces destined for 
that purpose. No appointment could have been more appro- 
priate than this. A gentleman of large landed estate in the 
northern section, thoroughly conversant with its resources 
and topography, and familiar not only with the habits and 
customs of the frontier population, but also wielding a great 
personal influence with the Indian tribes, he was the only man 
who could effectually neutralize the efforts of the British 
agents to influence the savages, who had always taken an active 
part in the border warfare. Moreover, his great wealth and 
family alliances gave strength to the cause. Selecting Ticon- 
deroga as his natural base of operations, Schuyler built boats 
for a movement to surprise St. John, a position so important 
that it was called by the British officers the key of Canada. 

It is not possible here to recount the various incidents of 
the campaign. On the 3d of November, 1775, after a siege of 
fifty days, the garrison at St. John capitulated to Montgomery, 
whom Schuyler, forced by illness, contracted in the wet, un- 
healthy country, to return to Ticonderoga, had left in com- 
mand. On the 1 2th Montgomery was at Montreal. Mean- 



RETREAT FROM CANADA. 7 

while, Washington, to create a diversion in favor of the main 
movement, had sent Arnold by the way of the Kennebec and 
the Chaudiere to a direct attack on Quebec, After incredible 
hardships, in the midst of a winter remarkable for its in- 
clemency, Arnold reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec, on 
the lOth November. The junction of Montgomery and 
Arnold was made on the 3d December. 

On the morning of the last day of the year the assault was 
made ; the Americans were repulsed, and Montgomery fell. 
Thus ended the offensive movement upon Canada. Its result 
was the permanent holding by the British of the post of Que- 
bec — which became impregnable with the reinforcements re- 
ceived from England — and the mouth of the St. Lawrence, for 
a naval movement toward the lakes. In the beginning of 
1776 efforts were made to strengthen the American force in 
Canada ; and the old road by the riverside, from Albany 
through Stillwater and Saratoga, was again trodden by thou- 
sands of recruits, marching to almost certain death by battle 
or disease. Upon the death of Montgomery the command of 
the army before Quebec devolved on Wooster. He was 
superseded by Thomas in May. The small-pox was raging. 
To convey an idea of the extent to which it had ravaged the 
army, it is only necessary to state that, on taking command, 
Thomas found that of 1,900 men and officers 900 were sick, 
chiefly with this disease. A retreat was ordered, but the rein- 
forced garrison sallying suddenly forth, the artillery was aban- 
doned, and the Americans fled in precipitation. In June 
Thomas died of the small-pox at Chamblee, leaving Sullivan in 
command. An attempt by the new chief to arrest the retreat 
was the cause of further disaster. Thompson, who led an expe- 
dition against Three Rivers, fell into an ambuscade, and was 
defeated by General Fraser. Among the British troops en- 
gaged were some who, arrived from England with the reinforce- 
ments under Burgoyne, had been piloted past Quebec by the 
orders of the sagacious Carleton in the very transports that 
had conveyed them across the ocean, and pushed up the 
river to the scene of action. Already the vast importance of 



8 DEPLORABLE CONDITION OF THE TROOPS. 

the river as a means of military communication was apparent. 
The remainder of the fleet with the British reinforcements 
coming up, the post of Sorel was abandoned by the Ameri- 
cans and the retreat again began. So close was the pursuit 
that the British advance entered Chamblee as the American 
rear left the town. At St. John they were joined by Arnold 
from Montreal. Firing the city, they again fell back to Isle 
aux Noix, and thence, slowly pursued by Burgoyne, to Crown 
Point, which they reached in the last days of June, [i/?^-] 
So ended the invasion of Canada, an expedition remark- 
able for its display of human suffering, human energy, and 
human endurance. History may be searched in vain for ex- 
amples of greater pertinacity under disaster, greater vigor 
under the severest trials. The fragments of the gallant 
bands which had united before Quebec and were now huddled 
together at Crown Point presented a picture which wrung 
the stoutest hearts. Pestilence was in their countenances. 
Pestilence infested the very air ; not a tent in which there was 
not a dead or dying man. The bones of the heroic Mont- 
gomery and his aide-de-camp, McPherson, lay within the walls 
of Quebec ; Burr and Lamb were prisoners ; Arnold still 
chafed under a painful wound, and the army itself had dwin- 
dled to a handful of emaciated skeletons. The troops at 
Crown Point now fell under the authority of General Schuyler. 
From the beginning the ill-health of Schuyler had rendered it 
impossible for him to take the field at the head of the army ; 
moreover, his great organizing spirit, his tireless energy, 
were of more service to the cause at the Albany headquarters, 
where his encouraging presence was indispensable. 

Arnold arrived at Albany with news of the retreat from 
Canada on the 24th of June. The next day Schuyler received 
information of the appointment of Major-General Gates to 
the command of the forces in Canada. 

The instructions to Gates gave him unusual powers. A 
question of jurisdiction at once arose, however, between him- 
self and Schuyler, which they agreed to submit to Congress, 
which on the 8th determined it by leaving the supreme 



GATES TAKES COMMAND. 9 

authority to Schuyler while this side of Canada, and to Gates 
when on the other side of the line. 

Horatio Gates, who now first appears upon the scene on 
the Canadian frontier, was of English birth. The son of a 
clergyman, he received his name from his godfather, Horace 
Walpole, under whose protection he early entered the British 
service, and rose rapidly to the rank of major. His regiment 
being ordered to America, he was badly wounded in the 
Braddock campaign. Later he distinguished himself by his 
bravery and capacity as an aide to Monckton on the expedition 
against Martinique. At the close of the French war he pur- 
chased a fine estate in Berkeley County, Ya., and became 
a successful farmer. On the breaking out of the Revolution 
he volunteered his services to Congress, and receiving the 
rank of brigadier, was chosen adjutant -general of the army. 
In this capacity his military experience and training were of 
great value in the organization of the Continental forces, 
and he was thus engaged in daily communication with Gen- 
eral Washington when he was assigned to his new command. 
He had been elected by Congress to the rank of major-gen- 
eral in May. 

Sullivan, taking offence at Gates' appointment, had retired 
from the army at Crown Point, the command of which was 
now assumed by Gates. A council of war, at which Schuyler, 
Gates, Sullivan, Arnold, and Baron de Woedtke were pres- 
ent, considering Crown Point as not tenable, ordered a 
withdrawal to Ticonderoga, which was effected. This gave 
great umbrage to Colonel Stark and other New Eng- 
land officers, who remonstrated with Schuyler against the 
move. The council which ordered the withdrawal also 
resolved upon the defence of Lake Champlain, by a naval 
armament of gondolas, row galleys, and armed batteaux. 

On the i6th of July Gates reported that the loss sustained 
by death and desertion during the campaign amounted to 
more than five thousand men, and that three thousand more 
were sick. The army gradually recovered its health and 
spirits, the defences of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence 



lO INVASION OF NEW YORK. 

were strengthened, connection was made between the camp 
and the road to Skenesborough, guns were mounted, and, in 
a word, every endeavor made to secure the northern gateway 
of the New York colony. Though a further offensive move- 
ment against Canada seemed no longer practicable, the line 
of the Hudson and the lakes was of paramount importance. 
While all eyes were turned in this direction, danger suddenly 
appeared at the other end of the line. New York City was 
invested by the most powerful fleet that had ever appeared 
in these western waters, and Washington was threatened by 
Lord Howe with a force of thirty thousand men. In July, 
Long Island was occupied by the enemy ; in September, New 
York fell into their permanent possession, and Washington 
retreated to the mainland. 

The naval armament prepared for the defence of Lake 
Champlain, by Arnold and the Americans, with incredible 
patience and labor, consisted of eight gondolas, three row gal- 
leys, and four sloops orschooners, but when finished there were 
only landsmen to command and soldiers to manoeuvre them. 
Arnold, it is true, had gained some experience as a super- 
cargo on West India voyages ; yet, with his usual careless 
imprudence, he left the main channel of Lake Champlain free, 
and on the 4th of October sailed into the open lake. Mean- 
while Carleton, assisted by shipbuilders from England, with 
abundant material from the Admiralty and the fleet on the 
Canadian stations, had constructed more than two hundred 
flat-boats at Montreal, and hauled thera to St. John, where 
they were launched and manned by seven hundred sailors and 
picked officers from the ships-of-war and a large force of Ger- 
man sharpshooters and light artillery trained for the special 
service. On the nth he sailed into the lake, and taking 
the main passage which Arnold had left open, fell on the 
American rear. A sharp action ensued, and for two days 
a running fight was maintained. Arnold's vessel sustained 
the contest to the last, but was finally driven into a creek 
on the eastern shore, where she was fired, the crew marching 
away in perfect order, with colors flying. 

1 

i 



CARLETON RETIRES TO QUEBEC. II 

On the 14th Carleton landed at Crown Point, the master 
of the lake. Two hours distant lay Ticonderoga, an easy- 
prey. But further movement was not his intention. He 
returned to Canada, and went into winter quarters in No- 
vember. Thus was the golden opportunity lost for a junc- 
tion of his forces with those of Lord Howe. This military 
blunder must not be ascribed to Carleton, who had re- 
ceived explicit instructions from Lord Germain to return to 
Quebec and re-establish good order and government in the 
province. He was also directed to send a detachment, under 
Burgoyne or some other officer, to reinforce General Howe at 
New York. When Gates heard that Carleton had turned his 
back on Crown Point he dismissed the militia, which had 
rallied in large numbers to his support. He had no provis- 
ions for their maintenance, and no ammunition for an offensive 
movement, had such a movement been desirable. The season 
of 1776 closed with Quebec and New York in the hands of 
the British. The lines of invasion by the St. Lawrence and 
lower Hudson were entirely open to the enemy. Schuyler 
was at Albany, indefatigable in his labors to secure the 
northern defences, and Washington in the Jerseys, covering 
the Highlands, and ready to move on any menaced point. 

Having thus endeavored as hurriedly as possible to sketch 
the Canada campaign from its promising beginning to its 
disastrous close, a few words may be permitted before pass- 
ing to the consideration of the events of 1777, which we are 
to-day celebrating, as to the attitude and position of New 
York at this juncture. For both the offensive campaign of 
1776 and the defensive campaign of 1777 Northern New York, 
with Albany as its centre, was the base of operations. It was 
the Albany Committee of Safety which first garrisoned Ticon- 
deroga after its capture. At Albany, arms, ammunition, 
and supplies were gathered. There guns were mounted, am- 
munition fixed, cartridges prepared. The magazines, arsenals, 
and laboratories were there. Till the final peace in 1783, 
Albany was not only the secure base for all the operations of 
the Northern Department, but the supply point whence the 
material of war was drawn even for distant expeditions. 



12 PATRIOTISM AND PRIVATIONS OF NEW YORK. 

Unfortunately for the perfect fame of our great State, jus- 
tice has never yet been done to its history. The Dutch period 
has been admirably portrayed by O'Callaghan and Broadhead, 
but the recital of her struggle for liberty and independence 
through the whole of the eighteenth century yet awaits the 
pen of some one of her gifted sons. When it shall be written, 
it will be found that she was second to none in devotion to 
the principles of individual freedom, not for herself alone, but 
for all the colonies. Her first commercial corporation dis- 
played this feeling in the adoption of the generous motto : 
^' Noil nobis nati sohun" — we are not born for ourselves 
alone, and during her subsequent history this has been her 
marked characteristic. 

Her central position made her the seat of war and sub- 
jected her to privations and sufferings which were unknown 
to the other colonies. Indeed, her calamities were a source 
of profit to her Eastern neighbors. When New York flour- 
ished they participated in her commerce and shared her pros- 
perity, but when by the fortune of war her opulent seaport 
fell into the hands of the enemy, she was not only burdened 
by a large population which had depended upon the luxury 
and trade of the capital, but, by an unjust customs discrimina- 
tion, was compelled to pay tribute to neighboring colonies, 
who refused to permit the passage through their territory of 
goods intended for consumption within her borders without 
payment of an import duty to themselves. This injustice was 
long remembered. There were other sufferings greater than 
the paralysis of trade. There was not a county in the State 
which was not at some time overrun by the enemy, carrying 
with them devastation and ruin. And still more terrible, her 
defenceless homes were exposed to the merciless savages, 
armed and incited by the ruthless policy of Great Britain. 
The traditions of these sufferings have been handed down 
among our people, and form the thrilling incident of legend 
and of song. 

After the return of Carleton to Quebec, Burgoyne, whose 
ambition was not satisfied with a secondary command, ob- 



BURGOYNE PLANS A CAMPAIGN. 1 3 

tained in December a leave of absence and returned to Eng- 
land, where he was sure of court favor. Of obscure and 
probably illegitimate birth, he had allied himself by a runa- 
way match with Lady Stanley, a daughter of the Earl of 
Derby. Immediately on his arrival he offered his services to 
the King in a personal interview, and submitted his views in 
a paper, entitled " Thoughts for Conducting the War from 
the side of Canada," on the 28th of February, 1777. In this 
plan we find for the first time a thoroughly devised scheme 
for the junction of the Canadian army with that of General 
Howe. The Canada army, operating from Ticonderoga, was 
to take possession of Albany, and after opening communica- 
tion with New York, to remain upon the Hudson River, and 
thereby enable Howe to act with his whole force to the south- 
ward. The plan included a diversion by the Mohawk, and a 
rising of the loyalists in that region by means of an expedition 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger. The 
King's remarks upon this plan still exist in the original docu- 
ment, in his handwriting in the British Museum. His criticism 
of it shows strong common sense, and a thorough knowl- 
edge of the field of action in America. The point which will 
be found of most interest is his urgent recommendation 
"that possession should be taken of Lake George." Noth- 
ing, he says, " but an absolute impossibility of succeeding in 
this can be an excuse for proceeding by South Bay and 
Skenesborough," which Burgoyne had suggested as an al- 
ternative. With regard to the Indians, the King says that 
" they must be employed." 

The order of the campaign being definitely arranged, Lord 
Germain addressed instructions to General Carleton, on the 
20th March, and the next day Burgoyne left London for Ply- 
mouth to take passage for Canada. He arrived at Quebec on 
the 6th May. Carleton immediately put under his command 
the troops destined for the expedition and committed to his 
management the preparatory arrangements. Before he left 
Plymouth Burgoyne had advised Sir William Howe of his pur- 
pose to effect a junction with him, and he also sent him a 



14 THE CAMPAIGN OPENED. 

second letter to the same effect from Quebec. On the loth 
June he issued his orders for the general disposition of the army 
at St. John. The movements of the troops were somewhat 
delayed by bad weather and bad roads, but notwithstanding 
all impediments the army of invasion assembled between the 
17th and 20th June at Cumberland Point, near the foot of 
Lake Champlain. On the 21st he held a conference with the 
Indian tribes at the camp on the River Bouquet. Burgoyne, 
with the main body, reached Crown Point on the 27th June. 
Many accounts have been written of the picturesque appear- 
ance oj the brilliant array of the British army as it passed up 
the lake. That of Captain Thomas Anburey, an educated 
young officer in the British service, and an eye-witness of the 
scenes he described, deserves repetition. " It moved," he 
says, " by brigades, gradually advancing from seventeen to 
twenty miles a day, and regulated in such a manner that the 
second brigade should take the encampment of the first, and 
so on, each successively filling the ground the other quitted. 
The time for departure was always at daybreak." The spec- 
tacle the enthusiastic young gentleman portrays as one of the 
most pleasing he ever beheld. " When in the widest part of 
the lake it was remarkably fine and clear, not a breeze stirring, 
when the whole army appeared at one view in such perfect 
regularity as to form the most complete and splendid regatta 
ever beheld. In the front the Indians went in their birch 
canoes, containing twenty or thirty in each ; then the advanced 
corps in a regular line with the gun-boats ; then followed the 
Royal George and Inflexible, towing large booms, which are 
to be thrown across two points of land, with the other brigs 
and sloops following ; after them the brigades in their order." 
On the 30th Burgoyne issued his famous order : " This army 
embarks to-morrow to approach the enemy. The services re- 
quired of this particular expedition are critical and conspicu- 
ous. During our progress occasions may occur in which nor 
difficulty nor labor nor life are to be regarded. This army 
must not retreat." An advanced corps, under command of 
General Fraser, was ordered up the west shore of the lake to 



THE ARMY OF BURGOYNE. 1$ 

a point four miles from Ticonderoga, and the German reserve, 
under Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman, moved up the eastern 
shore. 

On the 1st July the whole army made a movement forward, 
encamping in two lines, the right wing at the four mile point, 
the left nearly opposite, on the east shore. Two frigates with 
gun-boats lay at anchor, covering the lake from the east to 
the west shores. Just beyond cannon-shot lay the American 
batteries. The effective strength of the army of invasion at this 
period is precisely known. Burgoyne himself stated it to have 
been on the 1st July, the day before he encamped before Ticon- 
deroga, at 7,390 men, exclusive of artillery. These were com- 
posed of: British rank and file 3,724, German rank and file, 
3,016 ; in all 6,740 regulars ; Canadians and provincials, about 
250 ; Indians about 400 ; the artillerymen numbered 473. 
The total force was therefore 7,863 men. The field train con- 
sisted of forty-two pieces, and was unusually complete in all 
its details, Burgoyne in his narrative complained that the 
force of Canadians, which was estimated in the plan at 2,000, 
did not exceed* 1 50; a significant circumstance, as showing 
the correctneg? of the American estimate of the temper of the 
province. Of the discipline of the British and German troops 
nothing need be said ; they were all drilled and experienced 
soldiers. Among their officers were many who thoroughly 
understood the service in which they were engaged and the 
topography of the country in which they were to act. Bur- 
goyne had served with credit, and had distinguished himself 
by his dash and gallantry in Portugal, and had also the knowl- 
edge acquired in Canada the year previous. Major-General 
Phillips, who commanded the artillery, had won high praise 
at Minden. Brigadier-General Fraser, who led the picked 
corps of light troops, had taken part in the expedition against 
Louisburg and was with Wolfe at Quebec, He also had 
served in the Canada campaign of 1776. Riedesel was an 
accomplished officer, carefully trained in the service of the 
Duke of Brunswick, and had been selected by him to com- 
mand the German contingents, with the rank of major-general. 



1 6 FALL OF TICONDEROGA. 

The territory threatened by this formidable invasion was 
again at this period under the sole control of Major-General 
Schuyler, Congress, on the 22d May, on the recommendation 
of the Board of War, having resolved that Albany, Ticon- 
deroga, Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, should form 
the Northern Department, with General Schuyler in command. 
Vague reports of the movements of Burgoyne reached Schuy- 
ler toward the middle of June, and he at once visited Ticon- 
deroga to look to its defences. No accurate information of 
the force or designs of the enemy could be obtained, their 
advance being thoroughly covered by Indian scouts, who either 
captured or drove in all the reconnoitering parties of the 
Americans. Nevertheless, it was decided in a council of 
general officers, held on the 20th June, to defend the post. 
On the 22d Schuyler returned to Albany to hurry on rein- 
forcements and provisions, leaving the garrison, which con- 
sisted of less than twenty-five hundred men, in command of 
Major-General St. Clair. This was increased by the arrival 
of nine hundred militia in the course of a few days. 

The post at Ticonderoga, notwithstanding its high reputa- 
tion, was not really tenable. It was overlooked by an emi- 
nence known by the name of Sugar Hill, or Mount Defiance, 
the occupation of which had been neglected, either because 
of the supposed impracticabihty of carrying guns to its sum- 
mit, or of the weakness of the garrison, already spread over 
an extensive area, St. Clair had expected an attack from the 
lake side, and had fortified to meet it, but recognized the dan- 
ger of his situation when on the morning of the 5th the British 
were seen in possession of Sugar Hill. With his accustomed 
vigor. General Phillips had ordered a battery of artillery to 
the top of this eminence, to which the cannon were hoisted 
from tree to tree. The occupation of Mount Hope by Fraser 
on the 3d had already cut off the line of retreat by Lake 
George. There was but one course to pursue — an immediate 
evacuation of the post and a withdrawal by the only remain- 
ing line, that of the lake to Skenesborough. That night part 
of the cannon were safely embarked on batteaux, those left 



SKIRMISH AT HUBBARDTON. 1 7 

behind were spiked, and a hasty retreat began ; the sick and 
the baggage, ordnance and stores, were sent up the lake un- 
der charge of Colonel Long, and the main body crossing the 
lake by the bridge to Mount Independence moved towards 
Skenesborough by the new road lately cut by the garrison, 
to which allusion has already been made. The retreat was 
discovered at daylight on the 6th, and pursuit instantly began, 
Fraser, taking the route pursued by the garrison with the 
picket guard, hastened on, closely followed by Riedesel in 
support, while Burgoyne opened a passage through the bridge 
and led the galleys in chase of the battery up the lake. The 
wind being favorable, he overtook the retreating flotilla at 
Skenesborough, captured two of the covering galleys and 
compelled the destruction of the batteaux, which were fired 
by the Americans, who also destroyed the fort and mills at 
Skenesborough and retired up Wood Creek to Fort Ann. 
General Burgoyne took post at Skenesborough. ^ 

Meanwhile the main body of the Americans under St. Clair, 
hurrying along the unfinished road through the wilderness, 
reached Hubbardton, twenty-five miles distant, at one o'clock 
on the 6th, when a halt was made. At five o'clock, hearing 
that the rear guard under Colonel Francis, for which he had 
waited, was coming up, St. Clair, leaving Colonel Warner 
with one hundred and fifty men at Hubbardton, with orders 
to follow when they arrived, moved on to Castleton, six miles 
distant, which he reached at dusk. When Francis joined War- 
ner, they concluded to spend the night at Hubbardton, where 
they were overtaken the next morning, when on the point of 
resuming their march, by Fraser's advance The Americans, 
about twelve hundred in number, formed in a strong position 
and maintained their ground with spirit until the bugle of the 
Hessians announced the approach of Riedesel's corps. Their 
arrival decided the fortune of the day. The Americans 
behaved with great bravery until overpowered by numbers, 
when they broke and scattered. The losses in killed and 
wounded were about equal on the two sides. Fraser led his 
men in person. Major Grant, an officer of high reputation. 



1 8 THE AMERICANS RALLY AT FORT EDWARD. 

was killed. The Earl of Balcarras, who led the light infantry, 
and was now for the first time in action, was slightly, and 
Major Ackland severely, wounded. Of the Americans, Col- 
onel Francis fell while bravely rallying his men. St. Clair, 
hearing of the capture of Skenesborough, struck into the 
woods on his left. At Rutland he found some of Warner's 
fugitives. Taking a circuitous route, he reached the Hud- 
son River at Batten Kill, and joined General Schuyler at Fort 
Edward on the I2th. 

Schuyler heard on the morning of the 7th, in Albany, rumor 
of disaster, and immediately started for Fort Edward, to take 
command of the troops there, and await the arrival of Nixon's 
brigade from Peekskill, which had been detached from Put- 
nam's command at the Highlands by Washington's orders. 
At Fort Edward he learned that the party under Colonel 
Long had turned at Fort Ann and checked the pursuit. Set- 
ting fire to the work, they pushed on to Fort Edward, which 
they reached on the 9th. St. Clair, as has been stated, did 
not come in till the I2th. The whole force under Schuyler 
consisted of seven hundred Continental troops and a smaller 
number of militia, without a single piece of artillery. St. 
Clair brought in about fifteen hundred men. On the 13th 
Nixon arrived with his brigade of six hundred from Albany, 
and on the 20th the whole force fit for duty was returned at 
4,467 men, half-equipped and deficient in ammunition and 
every kind of supplies. Before them, at Skenesborough, 
within a day's forced march, lay Burgoyne with his superior 
force of veteran troops, flushed with victory. 

The first period of the campaign, as Burgoyne termed it 
in his narrative of his operations, ended at Skenesborough. 
So far his march had been successful ; triumphant even. 
With proud exultation his general orders of the loth, issued 
at Skenesborough House, directed that divine service should 
be performed on the next Sunday at the head of the line and 
of the advanced corps, and a fen de joie to be fired at 
sunset on the same day with cannon and small arms at 
Ticonderoga, Crown Point, the camp at Skenesborough, 



MILITARY ERROR OF BURGOYNE. I9 

the camp at Castleton, and the post of Breyman's corps. In 
the hour of pride commenced the second period of Burgoyne's 
campaign, which may be termed the period of his errors and 
his misfortunes. In the plan laid before the King, Burgoyne, 
as has already been stated, had himself expressed his belief 
that the possession of Lake George was of great consequence 
as the most expeditious and most commodious route to 
Albany, and that by South Bay and Skenesborough should 
not be attempted ; and the King himself expressed a similar 
opinion, adding that nothing but an absolute impossibility of 
succeeding by Lake George should be an excuse for proceed- 
ing by the other route. A glance at the map, even to one 
not familiar with the topography of the country, will make 
this apparent. The distance from Ticonderoga to Lake 
George is little over two miles. Lake George itself is about 
thirty-five miles long. The petty naval force on the lake, 
consisting of two small schooners, could not have resisted a 
brigade of gunboats. Fort George could have opposed no 
serious obstacle to the conqueror of " Ty." 

Gordon says, on military authority, and adds that Gates, 
who was familiar with every inch of ground, had repeatedly 
expressed the same opinion, that by a rapid movement with 
light pieces Burgoyne could have reached Albany by the 
time he got to the Hudson. This view was corroborated by 
Captain Bloomfield, of the Royal Artillery. In evidence 
before the committee of the House of Commons on the con- 
duct of the campaign, he said that the artillery could have 
been easily moved by land from Fort George to the Hudson 
River in two days. Even when at Skenesborough the true 
policy of Burgoyne was an immediate return to Ticonderoga 
to avail of the water line. His orders were to move by the 
most expeditious route. But General Burgoyne had pro- 
claimed, "This army must not retreat," and Phillips, his 
chief adviser, is known to have held the Americans in great 
contempt. Jefferson said of him, of personal knowledge, 
" that he was the proudest man of the proudest nation on 
earth." It has been said further that Burgoyne was misled 



20 SCHUYLER OBSTRUCTS THE ROAD. 

^ by Mr. Skene, who had persuaded him of a rising of the 
loyalists in the region ; and of Skene, that his main object was 
to secure the building of a military road through the extensive 
property of which he was proprietor, and which bore his 
name. Skenesborough is the present Whitehall. ^ 

Burgoyne, in excuse for his delays, says that, from the 
nature of the country and the necessity of waiting a fresh 
supply of provisions, it was impossible to follow the quick 
retreat of the Americans, and considered the short cut from 
Fort Ann to Fort Edward, though attended with great labor, 
as the most available route. Here was the first great error, 
of which the alert Schuyler, to whom every inch of the 
ground was familiar, was quick to take advantage. Imme- 
diately upon the arrival of Nixon's Brigade at Fort Edward 
it was advanced to Fort Ann to fell trees into Wood Creek, 
and upon the road from Fort Ann south. So thoroughly 
was this effected that the invading army was compelled to 
remove at every ten or twelve yards great trees which lay 
across the road, and exclusive of the natural difficulties of the 
country, the watery ground and marshes were so numerous 
that they were compelled to construct no less than forty 
bridges (one of which was nearly two miles in length) on the 
march from Skenesborough to Fort Edward. Lake George 
was partially used for the transport of stores. Fort George, at 
the head of the lake, having been abandoned by the Ameri- 
cans, who, after saving forty pieces of cannon and fifteen tons 
of gunpowder, barely escaped being cut off by the movement 
of the enemy to Fort Edward. Such were the obstructions 
thrown in his way that Burgoyne only made his headquarters 
at Fort Edward on the 30th of July, having consumed twenty- 
four days after his arrival at Skenesborough in a movement 
of twenty-six miles. Here his eyes were cheered with a first 
view of the Hudson, a vision delusive as a mirage. 

Schuyler, having secured his artillery, began to fall back 
and, on the 27th, abandoned Fort Edward to the British, 
taking post at Moses' Creek, four miles below, which Kosci- 
usko had settled upon as a more defensible place than Fort 



WASHINGTON AND SCHUYLER HOPEFUL. 21 

Edward, which was almost in ruins. So elated was Schuyler 
by the bringing off of the artillery, that he wrote that " he 
believed the enemy would not see Albany this campaign." 
A week later, by advice of all the general officers, he moved 
his army, first to Fort Miller, six miles below, then to Sara- 
toga, and finally to Stillwater, about thirty miles north of 
Albany, where he proposed to await reinforcements and 
fortify a camp. Stillwater was reached on the 3d of August, 
and an intrenchment was begun the next day. 

The fall of Ticonderoga had excited intense alarm through- 
out the country ; the popular imagination had invested it with 
the impregnability of an enchanted castle. Its capture had 
been the first conquest of the patriots, and it was supposed to 
be the natural key to the Northern region. Yet in spite of the 
popular discouragement, the leaders were still hopeful of a 
happy result of the campaign. So confident was Schuyler in 
ultimate success that he expressed the presentiment on the 14th 
of July that " we shall still have a Merry Christmas," and on 
the 25th he wrote to the Committee of Albany that the pro- 
gress of Burgoyne need give no alarm — to use his own words, 
that should he ever get as far down as Half Moon he would 
run himself into the greatest danger, and that in all proba- 
bility his whole army would be destroved. This hopefulness 
was not confined to Schuyler. Washington himself at this 
period expressed his opinion that the success Burgoyne had 
met with "would precipitate his ruin," and that his " acting 
in detachments was the course of all others most favorable to 
the American cause." He adds: " Could we be so happy 
as to cut one of them off, supposing it should not exceed 
four, five or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people and 
do away with much of their present anxiety. In such an 
event they would lose sight of past misfortune, and, urged at 
the same time by a regard for their own security, they would 
fly to arms and afford every aid in their power." In view of 
the events about to transpire, the words of the great chief 
seem almost prophetic. 

To us in these days, looking over the field without passion, 



22 FAILURE OF ST. LEGER. 

prejudice or fear, it seems that even a junction between Bur- 
goyne and Howe would not have been by any means fatal to 
the patriot cause. The British had not the force adequate to 
maintain the line of the Hudson. At no time did their army 
at the north hold more than the ground on which they stood. 
Howe, like Burgoyne, derived his provisions and supplies 
from England. 

While Burgoyne was slowly plodding his way against al- 
most insuperable difficulties in the path he had chosen, check- 
ing desertion only by constant executions, and even by au- 
thority to the savages to scalp every soldier found outside 
the lines, St. Leger, with his command reinforced by Sir 
John Johnson and the loyalists of Tryon county, appeared 
before Fort Stanwix on the 2d of August. The story of the 
siege and the bloody struggle on the field of Oriskany need 
not be recited here. The brave resistance of the garrison 
under Gansevoort and Willett, and the heroic behavior of 
Herkimer and the yeomanry of Tryon against desperate 
odds, have lately been occasion of centennial celebration. 
This expedition was a principal feature of the original plan of 
the campaign, and, although St. Leger held an independent 
command, his failure was a complete paralysis of the right 
wing of the army of invasion. Stunned by the resistance he 
encountered, and learning of the reinforcement of the Ameri- 
cans by troops from Schuyler's command, he retraced his 
steps to Oswego, and thence with the remnant of his force to 
Montreal, where he arrived too late to take any further part 
in the campaign. 

From the 30th of July to the 15th of August, Burgoyne 
was busy at Fort Edward, getting down batteaux, provisions, 
and ammunition from Fort George to the Hudson, a distance 
of about sixteen miles. The roads were out of repair in some 
parts, steep and much broken by exceeding heavy rains ; 
with all his exertions he was not able in fifteen days to ac- 
cumulate more than four days' provisions for a forward move- 
ment. This delay, however, enabled him to carry out an- 
ther cherished plan, that of detaching a corps from his left, 



BURGOYNE RESUMES HIS MARCH. 23 

in order, to use his own words, " to give jealousy " to Con- 
necticut, and hold in check the country known as the Hamp- 
shire Grants. To this he had been further incited by Major- 
General Rjiedesel, who had commanded the Black Hussars in 
Germany, and was now anxious to mount his dragoons. 

Besides this inducement, Burgoyne had learned that Ben- 
nington was the great deposit of corn, flour, and cattle, that it 
was guarded by militia only, and that the country about was 
much disaffected to the Americans. Under these impres- 
sions, with this purpose, and being now ready for his own 
advance, he despatched an expedition under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Baum. At daybreak on the 14th, Burgoyne broke 
camp at Fort Edward and began his advance. His objective 
point was Albany, where he expected to be joined by St. 
Leger coming down the Mohawk, and Baum from his raid 
upon Bennington. 

On the 14th, he established his headquarters at Duer's 
house (at Fort Miller), about six miles below. A bridge of 
rafts was constructed, over which the advance corps passed 
the Hudson and encamped on the heights of Saratoga. On 
the 17th, before the main body could be gotten over, the 
river being swollen by heavy rains, and the current running 
rapidly, the bridge was carried away. The advance being 
thus isolated, was recalled, and recrossed the river in scows 
and took up their old encampment on the Batten Kill. 
Here, at a shoal part of the river, a pontoon was constructed 
across the Hudson, directly opposite Saratoga, which was 
completed about the 20th. But obstacles of another nature 
presented themselves. On the 17th, Burgoyne receiving in- 
formation of disaster to Baum, and suddenly convinced of 
the impossibility of obtaining provisions and supplies from 
the country, in his general orders informed the troops of 
the necessity of a halt. For the first time his eyes were 
opened to the difficulties of his situation. He found himself 
with an extended line of communication, no hope of obtain- 
ing provisions in the neighborhood, deceived as to the senti- 
ment of the country and in the midst of a hardy population 



24 FAILURE OF BAUM, 

exulting in success. The surprise and defeat of Baum by 
Stark and Warner with the New England militia on the 15th 
of August was not to him the most discouraging feature of 
the battle of Bennington. It was the rally of the farmers 
from every quarter, all accustomed to the use of firearms 
from childhood in a section of country abounding in game. 
Not Braddock himself in the toils of Indian stratagem was 
more helpless than the Hessians of Baum and Breyman, with 
clumsy accoutrements, their heavy boots sinking at every 
step deep in the wet soil, and moving with military disci- 
pline, exposed to the fire of a thousand marksmen concealed 
by bushes and trees. 

To relate the incidents of the glorious victory at this time 
and before this audience would be to tell a " twice-told tale." 
But it is not to be forgotten that this battle also was fought 
on the soil of the Empire State. Its result justified Washing- 
ton's military judgment in his opinion of the danger to Bur- 
goyne of detached operations, and the enthusiasm it aroused 
realized his prediction and showed his thorough knowledge 
of the temper of the people. To the army of Burgoyne the 
consequences were serious. The return of the scattered rem- 
nant of the force, which went out from camp in such high 
hopes and spirits, damped the ardor of both officers and men, 
A few days later a courier from St. Leger, guided by a 
friendly Indian by Saratoga Lake and Glens Falls, brought 
intelligence of failure in that quarter. The shadow which 
had fallen on the army now deepened into gloom. In spite 
of all these discouragements the proud spirit of Burgoyne 
could not brook the thought of abandoning the expedition. 
Choosing to adopt a strict construction of the King's orders 
"to go to Albany," he assumed the entire responsibility of 
further advance without consultation of his officers. 

It was not until the 12th September that Burgoyne, com- 
pelled to depend wholly upon Canada for supplies, had 
accumulated the thirty days' provisions which he thought 
necessary to his further advance. On that day he issued his 
orders to move. 



BURGOYNE CROSSES THE HUDSON. 25 

His army crossed the Hudson on the 13th, and on the 14th 
encamped on the heights and plains of Saratoga. Here was 
the country seat of General Schuyler, with his commodious 
dwelling, his mill, a church and several houses. Not a living- 
creature was to be seen, but broad fields, rich with waving 
grain ready for the reaper. Before night the wheat was cut 
and threshed and in the mill for grinding. The Indian corn 
was apportioned as forage for the horses, and the beautiful 
plantation, which in the morning was a scene of peace and 
plenty, stripped to the last blade. The passage of the river 
was the close of what Burgoyne terms the second period of 
his campaign. 

Before entering on the third period, which may be termed 
the battle period, we must return to the American army, 
which we left under Schuyler at Stillwater, intrenching their 
camp on the 4th August. On the same day he received ad- 
vice of the investment of Fort Stanwix ; on the 7th reports of 
the battle of Oriskany, with exaggerated account of the 
American loss. On the i ith he detached General Learned 
to the assistance of the garrison, and on the 15th Arnold, 
whom Washington had ordered to the Northern Department, 
because of his encouraging presence to the dispirited militia, 
was sent up with full powers to cover the Mohawk settle- 
ments. Alarmed by the prospect of St. Leger's descent by 
the Mohawk River, Schuyler, who on every occasion dis- 
played strategic skill of the first order, fell back from Still- 
water to the confluence of the Hudson and the Mohawk, 
where, on the 14th, he took post on Van Schaick's Island, nine 
miles from Albany. This had been selected as a secure posi- 
tion for the main body, which had been greatly weakened by 
the detachments sent up the valley of the Mohawk and to the 
Hampshire Grants, where General Lincoln had gone, by 
order of Washington, to organize a movement to cut ofi" Bur- 
goyne's communication with Canada. 

Correct as all these movements of General Schuyler appear 
to us now, as seen in the light of history, they were the cause 
of intense dissatisfaction to the people, whom each successive 



26 POPULAR DISTRUST OF SCHUYLER. 

movement of Burgoyne had filled with alarm. Rumors derog- 
atory to the personal courage and integrity, as well as the 
patriotism, of Schuyler were rife in all sections, particularly 
in New England, where the old prejudice against their Dutch 
neighbors still prevailed. In all the difficulties with regard to 
boundary Schuyler had been prominent in defence of the 
rights of the New York colony, and the antagonism between 
the two sides of the river was now intensified by the revolt of 
the Hampshire Grants against the authority of New York, 
and their declared purpose to set up a State for themselves. 
Schuyler, whose spirit was high and whose nature was sensi- 
tive to excess, chafed sorely under the accusations against 
him, but, sustained by his own sense of the value of his ser- 
vices, the sympathy of the New^ York Government and the 
confidence of Washington, he had maintained his command. 
The year before he had demanded an investigation into his 
conduct in evacuating Crown Point, which was looked upon 
as the beginning of disaster, and had tendered his resignation 
to Congress, who, however, refused to accept of it, and prom- 
ised an investigation of his conduct. In November he had 
applied again to Congress for permission to repair to Phila- 
delphia on that business, to which Congress consented. Ap- 
pointed delegate to Congress by the New York Convention, 
he had taken his seat in April, and secured the passage of a 
resolution of inquiry. The committee made a report in May, 
which thoroughly vindicated him and placed him in full com- 
mand of the Northern Department. 

The advance of Burgoyne, penetrating into the heart of the 
country, and the fact that Schuyler himself had personally 
participated in no engagement, revived the distrust with 
which he was viewed by the Eastern troops ; a distrust which 
paralyzed his influence and made a change in the command 
of the Northern Department an absolute necessity. No 
stronger proof of the existence and strength of this feeling 
is needed than his own words. Writing to Washington from 
Saratoga, on the 28th July, he said : "So far from the 
militia that are with me increasing, they are daily dimin- 



GATES RELIEVES SCHUYLER. 2/ 

isliing, and I am very confident that in ten days, if the 
enemy should not disturb us, we shall not have five hundred 
left ; and although I have entreated this and the Eastern 
States to send up are-enforcement of them, yet I doubt much 
if any will come up when the spirit of malevolence knows no 
bounds, and I am considered as a traitor." 

On the 1st of August Congress passed resolutions ordering 
General Schuyler to repair to headquarters, and directed 
Washington to order such general officer as he deemed proper 
to relieve him in his command. On the 4th a letter from 
Washington was laid before Congress, asking to be excused 
from making an appointment of an officer to command the 
Northern army. An election was then held by Congress, and 
Major-General Gates was chosen by the vote of eleven States. 
Washington was informed of the result, and was directed to 
order General Gates at once to his post. Washington was 
then at Philadelphia, and the same day informed Gates of his 
appointment. Schuyler was at Albany when the resolution 
reached him on the loth. His magnanimity on this occasion 
is matter of record. Solomon tells us that, " Better is he 
that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh a city." To no man 
of whom history, ancient or modern, makes mention can this 
phrase be more justly applied than to Schuyler. The judg- 
ment of Congress as to the propriety of a change is sufficiently 
shown by Schuyler's own letters to that body on the 15th 
August, in which he said that he had not been joined by any 
of the New England militia, and that there were only sixty or 
seventy on the ground from the State of New York. Whether 
Schuyler had great military capacity or not is a question 
which cannot be answered. That he had no opportunity of 
displaying it on the field is certain ; that he was possessed of 
the strongest common sense and of that rarest quality in the 
human mind, the organizing faculty, is beyond doubt. No 
other man in America could have performed the services 
which he rendered, and it may certainly be said that they 
were second only to those of Washington in importance and 
extent. He continued in command of the troops until the 



28 GATES ADVANCES TO BEMIS HEIGHTS. 

arrival of Gates on the 19th August, to whom he gave the 
cordial reception of a soldier and a gentleman. 

Gates was by no means overjoyed at the responsibility with 
which he was entrusted. He found the army dejected, although 
somewhat encouraged by the victory at Bennington. His 
arrival revived the spirits of the troops, and the precision which 
he at once introduced into the camp increased their resolution. 
Words of congratulation and encouragement pressed in upon 
him from the eastward, and the announcement of the approach 
of militia from all sections added to the courage of the men. 

During the retreat the army had been greatly distressed by 
the savages in Burgoyne's command, who hung upon the 
flanks and outposts, and by their merciless cruelty excited an 
alarm which their real importance by no means justified. 
Washington, aware of the disadvantage under which the militia 
lay in their apprehension from this cause, on the 20th dis- 
patched Colonel Morgan to his assistance with his corps of rifle- 
men. This corps of five hundred men was a corps d' elite, which 
had been selected from the entire army for their proficiency 
in the use of the rifle and the Indian mode of warfare. Gates 
thanked Washington warmly for this valuable assistance and 
for his advice concerning the use to be made of them. They 
arrived on the 23d. To them Gates added two hundred and 
fifty bayonets, also carefully picked from the line, whom he 
placed under the command of Major Dearborn, a determined 
officer. 

On the 8th September, the army having been recruited to 
about 6,000 men. Gates felt strong enough to make a forward 
movement, and marched to Stillwater, where ahne of intrench- 
ments was begun the next day. It was soon found, however, 
that the extent of low ground was too great to admit of proper 
defence of the centre and left. A more favorable point was 
selected, two miles and a half to the northward, where a range 
of hills, covered by a narrow defile in front and jutting close 
upon the river, offered an admirable defensive position. The 
fortification was at once begun, under the direction of Kos- 
ciusko, the Engineer-in-Chief, and the army took possession on 



burgoyne's communications cut. 29 

the 1 2th. The ground is that which was then and is now 
known as Bemis' Heights, and upon it were contested the 
hard-fought actions which determined the campaign. Here 
Gates resolved to await the attack of Burgoyne, without pre- 
cipitating movements with his mostly raw troops until they had 
acquired some discipline ; certainly not until he should hear of 
the success of the attempt making to reach Burgoyne's rear 
and distress his army. 

General Lincoln, who was charged with this expedition, 
moved from Manchester to Pawlet with his militia force, con- 
sisting of about two thousand men. On his advance, the 
British guard at Skenesborough fell back, destroying a num- 
ber of boats. On the 13th he despatched Colonel Brown with 
five hundred men to the landing at Lake George, to release 
the American prisoners and destroy the British stores, and the 
same number of men under Colonel Johnson to Mount Inde- 
pendence, to create a diversion in favor of the operations of 
Colonel Brown, who was directed to push to Ticonderoga, if 
opportunity offered. A like number of men was also sent, 
under Colonel Woodbridge, to Skenesborough, thence to 
Fort Ann, and on to Fort Edward. Lincoln at once advised 
Gates of this movement. Colonel Brown managed his op- 
erations with great skill and secrecy. After a night march he 
reached the north end of Lake George at daybreak on the 
morning of the 17th, surprising in detail all the outposts be- 
tween the landing and the fortress of Ticonderoga ; Mount 
Defiance, Mount Hope, the French lines, a block-house, two 
hundred batteaux and several gunboats, taking prisoners two 
hundred and ninety- three British and Canadians, and releas- 
ing one hundred Americans. Among his trophies was the 
Continental standard left at Ty when the Fort was evacuated. 
The guns at Fort Defiance were turned upon the fortress of 
Ticonderoga, but no impression could be made on its walls. 
Taking the gunboats. Brown sailed up the lake, and on the 
24th made an attack on Diamond Island, about four miles 
north of Fort George, but was warmly received and repulsed. 
Making for the eastern shore, he reached the camp of Gejieral 



30 BURGOYNE MOVES TO ATTACK. 

Warner at Skenesborough on the 26th, by way of Fort Ann. 
A curious testimony to the effect of these raids on the rear of 
the British army exists in the Gates papers, in an intercepted 
letter from St. Leger, written at Ticonderoga the 29th Septem- 
ber, informing Burgoyne of his arrival there, and asking for 
guides to lead him down. 

To return to Burgoyne, whom we left encamped at Sara- 
toga on the 14th. The next day he moved forward at noon, 
forming his troops into three columns, after passing Schuyler's 
house, and encamped at Dovogat (the present Coeville), 
where they lay accoutred that night. On the i6th there was 
a fog so heavy that even foragers were forbidden to leave 
camp. Later in the day detached parties were employed in 
repairing the bridges and reconnoitering the country. 

On the 17th the army resumed their march, repaired 
bridges and encamped at Sword's Farm, four miles from 
Gates' position. The general orders directed the army to be 
under arms at an hour before daybreak. His approach was 
known to Gates by report of his adjutant, Wilkinson, who 
led a scouting party and sawthe passage of the river. On 
the 1 8th preparations were made to harass him, and General 
Arnold was sent out with fifteen hundred men to endeavor 
to stop the repair of the bridges. After some light skir- 
mishing Arnold fell back, and Burgoyne moved forward as far 
as Wilbur's Basin, about two miles from the American posi- 
tion. He there established his camp, which he fortified with 
intrenchments and redoubts, his left on the river, his right 
extending at right angles to it across the low ground about 
six hundred yards, to a range of steep and lofty heights ; a 
creek or gully in his front, made by a rivulet which issued 
from a great ravine formed by the hills, known as the North 
Ravine. 

On the morning of the 19th, Burgoyne, after a careful recon- 
noitering of the passages of the great ravine and the road 
around its head, leading to the extreme left of the American 
camp, advanced to the attack in three divisions. Fraser on 
the right, with the light infantry, sustained by Breyman's Ger- 



THE AMERICAN POSITION. 3 1 

man riflemen, and covered on the flanks by Canadians, Pro- 
vincials, and Indians, made a wide circuit to the west in order 
to pass the ravine without quitting the heights, and afterwards 
to cover the march of the hne to the right. The centre, com- 
manded by Burgoyne in person, passed the ravine in a direct 
line south, and formed in order of battle as fast as they gained 
the summit, where they waited to give time for Fraser to 
make the circuit. The left wing, led by Riedesel and Phillips, 
and composed of the Hessian troops and the artillery, moved 
along the river road and meadows in two columns. Their 
advance was delayed by the repair of the bridges. The 
Forty-seventh Regiment were charged with the guard of the 
batteaux containing the stores of the army. Burgoyne's pur- 
pose was himself to attack the left of the American lines in 
front and engage their attention until Fraser, moving over the 
table land, should turn the extreme left of the American posi- 
tion and reach their rear. Riedesel and Phillips were to 
change direction at the southern end of the ravine and march 
west to connect with the British centre. When, between one 
and two o'clock, the columns had reached their positions they 
moved at signal guns. From the conformation of the ground 
this was the only practicable manner by which Burgoyne 
could possibly advance, the river road being covered by the 
American artillery. 

Beyond the great North Ravine in front of the British posi- 
tion, and half way between it and the ground fortified by the 
Americans, there was another deep ravine called the Middle 
Ravine, through which Mill Creek still runs, and directly in 
front of the American camp and covered by its guns was 
another ravine of lesser extent, but still a formidable obstruc- 
tion to the advance of an enemy. The whole country, with 
the exception of a few cleared patches, was heavily wooded, 
the ravines as well as the upper table lands. On the high 
ground (Bemis' Heights) south was the American entrenched 
line, extending eastwardly to the river bank and westwardly 
to the extremity of the hill where a redoubt was begun. 
Beyond it felled trees obstructed the passage of the gullies 



32 GATES ATTACKS THE ENEMY. 

between the flank defences on the left and the neighboring 
hills. The lines, which were about a mile in extent, en- 
closed what is still known as Neilson's Farm. The hills on 
the east of the Hudson commanded a general view of Bur- 
goyne's camp. 

On the morning of the 19th, Gates was informed by Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Colburn, of the New Hampshire line, who 
had been sent out the day before to observe the movements 
of the enemy, that the British had struck their tents and 
crossed the gully at the gorge of the great ravine, and were 
ascending the heights toward the American left. Arnold, 
who commanded the left wing, and was at this time at head- 
quarters, suggested a movement to attack. Colonel Morgan, 
with his rifle corps, supported by Major Dearborn's light 
infantry, was immediately ordered out to observe their direc- 
tion and harass their advance. About half-past twelve a re- 
port of small arms announced that Morgan's men had struck 
the enemy. They had fallen in with Burgoyne's pickets, who 
made the advance guard of the British line, and had posted 
themselves in a cabin on Freeman's farm, which was one of 
the few cleared spots in that thickly wooded country. They 
were quickly dislodged by Morgan, who, pursuing hotly, fell 
on the main body, which Burgoyne had formed into line in 
the first opening in the woods, by whom they were instantly 
routed, with loss of several officers and men. Wilkinson, who 
witnessed the rally of the riflemen, hurried to Gates, who at 
once gave directions for their support. Cilley's and Scam- 
mel's regiments of New Hampshire (part of General Poor's 
brigade of Continental regulars) were ordered to advance 
through the woods and take ground on the left of Morgan, 
and the action was renewed about one o'clock. 

This movement would have turned the British right but for 
the disposition of General Fraser, who had promptly arrived 
at his appointed post and taken an advantageous position on 
a height, which covered the British right. Meeting this ob- 
stacle the Americans counter-marched, and pushed through 
the woods toward the left of Burgoyne's column. To their 



THE:, BATTLE OF FREEMAN'S FARM. 33 

support the five remaining regiments of Poor's brigade, con- 
sisting of Hale's, of New Hampshire ; Van Cortlandt's and 
Henry Livingston's, of New York, and Cook's and Latimer's, 
of the Connecticut Militia, were successively led to the field 
at the points of the action where greatest pressure was per- 
ceived. About three o'clock the action became general. Bur- 
goyne's division was vigorously attacked and suffered severely. 
One regiment of grenadiers and part of the light infantry under 
Lord Balcarras from Eraser's division participated at times in 
the action, but it was not thought advisable to weaken Era- 
ser's force on the heights, except partially and occasionally. 
Major-General PhiUips, hearing the firing, made his way at 
once through the woods to Burgoyne's support, bringing with 
him four pieces of artillery, a difficult task, considering the 
nature of the ground, and entered the action at a critical time. 
Riedesel also got up with part of the left wing before the close 
of the battle. The Americans, feeling the pressure of this 
reinforcement. Gates ordered out the whole of Learned's 
brigade, consisting of Bailey's, Wesson's, and Jackson's regi- 
ments, of the Massachusetts line, and James Livingston's, of 
New York, and also Marshall's regiment, of the Massachusetts 
line. They were but shghtly engaged. Darkness ended the 
contest, the Americans only withdrawing when objects became 
undistinguishable. The number engaged on each side was 
not far from equal. The American force was about 3,000, 
and Burgoyne stated his to be about 3,500. The mode of 
fighting of the Americans more than equalled this discrep- 
ancy. The field of action was such that, although the com- 
batants changed ground a dozen times in the course of the 
day, the contest terminated with each body in its original po- 
sition. The British were formed on an eminence in a thin 
pine wood, having before it Freeman's farm, an oblong field, 
stretching from its centre toward its right, the ground in 
front sloping gently down to the verge of the field, which was 
bordered on the opposite side by a close wood, held by the 
Americans. The sanguinary scene lay in the cleared ground 
between the eminence occupied by the enemy and the wood 
3 



34 BRAVERY OF THE AMERICAN TROOPS. 

just mentioned. The fire of the American marksmen from the 
wood was too deadly to be withstood by the British in Hne, and 
when they gave way and broke, the Americans, making 
for their centre, pursued them to the eminence, where, 
having their flanks protected, they ralHed, and charging in 
turn drove the Americans back into the wood, whence a 
dreadful fire would again force them to fall back, and in this 
manner did the battle fluctuate, like the waves of a stormy 
sea, with alternate advantage^, for four hours without one mo- 
ment's intermission ; the British artillery fell into the hands 
of the Americans 'at every charge, but they could neither 
turn the pieces on the enemy nor bring them off; the wood 
prevented the last, and the want of a match the first, as the 
linstock was invariably carried off, and the rapidity of the 
transitions would not allow time tp provide one. The slaugh- 
ter of the artillery was remarkable, the captain and twenty- 
six men out of forty-eight being killed or wounded. Such is 
Wilkinson's concise and picturesque account of this action, 
which he considered one of the longest, warmest, and most 
obstinate battles fought in America. Here was seen the su- 
periority of the American rifle over the British bayonet, on 
which Burgoyne so confidently relied. In his report to Con- 
gress, Gates accorded the glory of the action entirely to the 
valor of the rifle regiment and corps of light infantry under 
the command of Colonel Morgan. The British were sur- 
prised at the courage and obstinacy with which the Ameri- 
cans fought, and, as one who was present has recorded, found 
to their dismay that they were not that contemptible enemy 
they had been hitherto imagined, incapable of standing a reg- 
ular engagement, and willing only to fight behind strong and 
powerful works. 

The battle on the part of the Americans was essentially a 
soldiers' battle. While Burgoyne led his men in person, ex- 
posing himself with great bravery, directing the movements 
of the British line, the Americans had no general officer in 
the field until the evening, when General Learned was 
ordered out. The battle was fought by the general concert 



BURGOYNE FORTIFIES HIS POSITION. 35 

and zealous co-operation of the corps engaged, and sustained 
more by individual courage than military discipline, as is 
shown by the loss of the militia in comparison with that of 
the regular troops. 

During the action Gates and Arnold remained in front of 
the centre of the camp. This is no matter for comment or 
surprise, as it was neither the policy nor the purpose of 
Gates to bring on a general engagement, which might have 
involved his forces to such an extent as to leave his right 
exposed and uncover the river road. The intrenchments 
were not half completed, those on the left hardly begun. 
Moreover, the militia were every day arriving. Each day's 
delay increased his own chances of success while diminishing 
those of the enemy. 

The loss of the Americans, killed, wounded and missing, 
was three hundred and twenty-one ; that of the British, 
six hundred — a disparity more remarkable, as the ground 
did not admit of the use of artillery by the Americans. 
Both sides claimed the victory ; in reality it was a drawn 
battle. The British held the strong position Fraser had 
occupied in the morning, which, however. Gates had no 
desire of disputing, as his army was acting on the defensive. 
The Americans, on the other hand, had marched out from 
their camp, met the enemy more than half way, and after 
inflicting upon them a stunning blow, returned to their in- 
trenchments. Far more important than any physical advan- 
tage was the effect on the morale of the two armies. The 
patriots had met the main body of the invading army on 
equal terms, while the invaders had learned to their bitter 
cost the terrors of a warfare in which their discipline was- of 
little avail. 

The British lay on their arms the night of the battle, and the 
next day, the 20th, took a position just out of reach of the can- 
non of the American camp, where they fortified, and at the 
same time extended their left to the brow of the heights, so 
as to cover the meadows on the, river. A bridge of boats 
was thrown over the Hudson, and a work erected on the east 



2,6 GATES REMAINS ON THE DEFENSIVE. 

side of the river. The Americans on their side worked dili- 
gently in completing the defences of their extremely strong 
position. The morning was foggy, and there was consider- 
able alarm in the American camp, caused by the story of a 
deserter, that an attack was intended. It has been since 
stated that Burgoyne really directed a movement, but was 
dissuaded by General Fraser, who, because of the fatigue of 
his men, begged for a day's delay. Meanwhile a spy from 
Clinton brought a letter to Burgoyne, with advice of his 
intended expedition against the Highlands, which determined 
him to postpone the attack and await events. If such were 
the case, this was another and fatal error of Burgoyne. His 
general orders, however, of the 20th, ordering the advance 
of the army at 3 o'clock, seem inconsistent with the story, 
and there is no confirmation of it in his own narrative ; but, 
on the contrary, he admits that he was persuaded that the 
American camp was strongly fortified. On the 22d, Gates 
learned from General Lincoln of Colonel Brown's success at 
Ticonderoga. His reply to Lincoln shows that at this time 
he did not feel himself strong enough to prevent Burgoyne's 
retreat. He therefore urged the destruction of all buildings, 
batteaux, etc., on the line which should afford him shelter, 
that, to use his own words, " he may have no resting-place 
until he reaches Canada." The next morning he adds a 
postscript, to the effect that, by his scouts, it was " past a 
doubt that the enemy's army remain in their camp, that their 
advance was within one mile of his own, and urged the 
immediate forwarding of the militia. " He is satisfied, he adds, 
" that New York, and not Ticonderoga, is General Burgoyne's 
object." 

On the 23d, in consequence of a direction in general orders 
that Morgan's independent corps was responsible to head- 
quarters only, a difference which had been long brewing 
between Gates and Arnold ended in a public dispute. High 
words passed between them. Arnold was excluded from 
headquarters, and demanded permission to go to Philadelphia 
to report to Congress, a request of which Gates took instant 



BURGOYNE HOLDS A COUNCIL OF WAR. 3/ 

advantage. Suspended from command at his own desire, 
Arnold found too late the unfortunate position in which he 
would place his reputation by leaving the army at this critical 
juncture. He changed his mind and remained in camp, mur- 
muring discontent and spreading sedition by the intemper- 
ance of his conduct and language. Gates took Arnold's 
division under his own command and assigned Lincoln, who 
came in the same day, to the command of the right wing. 

With the militia who flocked to Gates' camp came a band 
of Oneida and Tuscarora Indians, who had been persuaded 
by the influence of Schuyler, then active as Indian Com- 
missioner, to join the army. They were objects of such curi- 
osity that it became necessary to forbid the soldiers from 
flocking to their encampment. These Indians were, however, 
a terror to the enemy. Gates' orders distinguished them from 
Burgoyne's savages by a red woollen cap. 

On the 3d October, Burgoyne was compelled to diminish 
the soldiers' rations, the foraging parties meeting but little 
success, and requiring heavy covering parties. The Ameri- 
cans were constantly in the field, harassing the advanced 
pickets, and night alarms prevented the British from quit- 
ting their clothes and deprived them of rest. The main 
bodies of both armies lay in quiet, while the woods resounded 
to the stroke of the axe, felling trees for the fortifications. 
Burgoyne sent word to Clinton on the 23d September, that 
he would await news from him until the 12th October. 

Riedesel, in his memoirs of the campaign, says that the 
situation becoming daily more critical and the enemy too 
strong, both in numbers and position, to be attacked, Bur- 
goyne on the 4th called Generals Phillips, Riedesel, and Fra- 
ser, to consult with them as to what measures to adopt. He 
proposed to leave the boats and stores under strong guard, 
and turning the left wing of Gates, to attempt an attack ; no 
decision was arrived at. A second conference was held on 
the evening of the 6th, when Riedesel recommended an im- 
mediate attack or a return to Batten-Kill. Fraser approved 
of this plan. Phillips declined to express an opinion. Bur- 



38 THE BATTLE OF BEMIS.. HEIGHTS. 

goyne terminated the discussion by declaring that he would 
make a reconoissance of the left wing of the Americans on the 
7th^ and if there were any prospect of success he would at- 
tack on the 8th or return to a position at Freeman's Farm? 
and on the i ith begin a retreat to the rear of Batten-Kill. 

Just before noon on the 7th Burgoyne marched out of camp 
with fifteen hundred men and ten pieces of artillery, destined 
for the reconnoissance, and also to cover a foraging party to 
relieve their immediate distress. The troops were formed into 
three columns, under Phillips, Riedesel, and Fraser, within 
three-quarters of a mile of the American left. The rangers, 
Indians, and provincials, were ordered to pass through the 
woods and gain the rear of the camp. The foraging party 
entered a field and began to cut the wheat in sight of the 
American outposts, when the alarm was given and the Ameri- 
cans beat to arms. Wilkinson went to the front to see the 
cause, and observed the foragers at work, the covering party, 
and the officers with their glasses endeavoring to reconnoitre 
the American left. He reported their position to Gates and 
gave as his opinion that they were inclined to offer battle. 
" I would indulge them," he added, whereupon Gates re- 
plied : " Well, then, order on Morgan to begin the game." 
A plan was concerted, with the approval of Gates, for Morgan 
to make a detour and gain a height on the right of the enemy, 
time enough for which was allowed him before Poor's brigade 
were sent to attack the left. The British generals were still 
consulting as to the best mode of pursuing the reconnoissance 
when the New Hampshire and New York troops of Poor's 
Brigade fell upon the British left, where the grenadiers under 
Major Ackland were posted, with impetuous fury and ex- 
tended the attack to the front of the Germans. At this time 
Morgan descended the hill and striking the light infantry on 
the right endeavored to turn their flank. Seeing his danger 
of being enveloped, Burgoyne ordered a second position to 
be taken by the fight infantry to secure the return of his 
troops to camp. Meanwhile Poor's brigade pressed the left 
with ardor and compelled them to give way. Fraser, with 



BURGOYNE FALLS BACK. 39 

part of his light infantry, moved rapidly to prevent an entire 
rout, and fell mortally wounded. Phillips and Riedesel were 
then ordered to cover a general retreat, which was effected 
in good order, though hard pressed, the enemy leaving eight 
pieces of cannon in the hands of the Americans, most of their 
artillerymen being killed or wounded. 

Hardly had the British entered their camp when it was 
stormed with great fury in the face of a severe fire of grape 
and musketry. The British intrenchments were stoutly de- 
fended by Balcarras and no impression was made. The Ger- 
man entrenched camp of Breyman, with the provincials, was 
carried by Learned, who appeared on the ground with his 
fresh brigade at sunset, and an Qpening was thus made in 
the right and rear which exposed the whole British camp, but 
the darkness of the night, and the fatigue and disorder of the 
men, prevented advantage being taken of this situation. 

In the night Burgoyne broke up his camp and retired to his 
original position, which he had fortified behind the Great 
Ravine. Thus closed the second battle of Saratoga, known as 
the Battle of Bemis Heights. The loss of the British was 
estimated at six hundred killed, wounded and taken prisoners, 
that of the Americans did not exceed one hundred and fifty 
killed and wounded. Burgoyne lost the flower of his officers. 
Besides General Fraser and Sir Francis Clark, his principal 
aide, who were mortally wounded, and Breyman who was 
killed. Majors Ackland and Williams were taken prisoners, 
the former wounded. On the American side Arnold, who 
behaved with the most desperate valor, exposing himself in a 
frantic manner and leading the troops without authority, just 
as the victory was won received a ball which fractured his 
leg and killed his horse ; and General Lincoln, while on his 
way to order a cannonade on the enemy's camp, received a 
musket-ball in the leg which shattered the bone. With re- 
gard to the conduct of this battle, much has been said. Gates 
has been blamed for not leaving his camp, and Arnold has 
been lauded as the hero of the day. These criticisms are 
equally unjust. Up to sunset, when Learned's corps was sent 



40 BURGOYNE RETREATS TO SARATOGA. 

forward to finish the action, there was only one brigade in 
the field. Gates' place was with the centre and right, where 
the militia were posted, and the security of his camp and the 
protection of the road to Albany his one true concern. Ar- 
nold's reckless daring no doubt encouraged and inspired the 
troops, but there is no evidence of any generalship on his part. 
Had the day resulted differently, he would have been deser- 
vedly cashiered. Gates, in his report to Congress of the 
1 2th, with great magnanimity, mentioned his gallantry and 
wound while forcing the enemy's breastworks. While com- 
mending all the troops engaged for their spirit, he gave es- 
pecial praise to Morgan's riflemen and Dearborn's light 
infantry. 

When Burgoyne fell back to his original position, he was 
in hopes that this change of front would induce Gates to form 
a new disposition, and perhaps attack him in his lines, where 
his superior artillery would have given him the advantage. 
During the 8th, he repeatedly offered battle to the American 
right, but Gates was too thorough a soldier to be tempted in 
this manner. His plans were more comprehensive. On the 
evening of the 7th he ordered General Fellows, who was at 
Tift's Mill with thirteen hundred men, to move to a position 
to prevent the recrossing of the Hudson at the Saratoga Ford. 
On the morning of the 8th Fellows took possession of the 
Saratoga barracks and began to throw up intrenchments, and 
sent an express to Bennington to hurry up troops to his as- 
sistance. Gates at once took possession of the abandoned 
c-amp at Freeman's Farm. 

Burgoyne receiving intelligence of this movement in his 
rear, began his retreat at nine o'clock at night, leaving his 
sick and wounded. A heavy rain causing him to delay at 
Dovogat, he only reached Saratoga on the night of the 9th, 
and his artillery could not pass the ford of the Fishkill till the 
morning of the loth. On the approach of the advance guard, 
Fellows, who had received notice of the retreat, crossed to 
the east side of the Hudson, where he was joined by the 
militia from Bennington, the rear of which arrived as Bur- 



GATES PURSUES. 4I 

goyne's front reached Saratoga. General Bayley, who com- 
manded the militia column, had posted a force of one thou- 
sand men to guard an intermediate ford, and also detached 
one thousand men to Fort Edward, to the command of which, 
at the request of Bayley, Stark was assigned on the 14th. 
The main body of Gates' army, having prepared their pro- 
visions and equipped themselves, started in pursuit about 
noon. In the afternoon of the loth at four o'clock the ad- 
vance reached Saratoga, and found Burgoyne encamped on 
the height beyond the Fishkill. -Gates' forces took a position 
in the wood, on the Saratoga heights, their right resting on 
the brow of the hill, about a mile in the rear of the Fishkill. 

On the nth Morgan was ordered to cross the Fishkill and 
fall upon the enemy's rear ; there was a heavy fog. Morgan 
struck their pickets and concluded that Burgoyne had not re- 
tired as was supposed. Patterson's and Learned's brigades 
were ordered to his support, and a vigorous cannonade was 
opened on the front and rear. Twelve hundred men of Pat- 
terson's corps had hardly crossed the creek when the fog 
lifted and the whole British Army was discovered in line of 
battle. The Americans fell back over the creek in disorder. 
Learned's corps was halted and the two brigades retired to a 
point a half mile distant, where they threw up entrenchments, 
which they held. The Americans succeeded in destroying a 
large number of batteaux and stores. 

The American artillery, which had taken no active part in 
the earlier battles, now came into play ; the passages of the 
river were covered by an incessant fire, every attempt to 
move the batteaux was instantly arrested, and as Burgoyne 
himself stated, no part of his position was secure from the guns. 

On the 1 2th a council of war was called by Burgoyne, and 
a retreat, leaving stores and baggage, was agreed upon, but 
the scouts reporting that no movement could be made with- 
out immediate discovery, the project was abandoned. On 
the 13th, only three days' stores remaining, a second council 
was held to which all field officers and captains commanding 
corps were invited. THey decided that the situation justified 



42 BURGOYNE SURRENDERS. 

capitulation upon honorable terms. Negotiations were open- 
ed on the 14th with General Gates, and on the i6th the conven- 
tion was signed. On the 17th October, the British army laid 
down its arms on the green in front of old Fort Hardy, on 
the north bank of the Fishkill, in the presence of Wilkinson, 
Gates' adjutant, and Burgoyne, accompanied by Riedesel 
and Phillips, rode to the American headquarters. They 
were met by General Gates, followed by his suite, and ac- 
companied by General Schuyler, who had come up from Al- 
bany for the occasion. The British troops were then marched 
past in view of the American army, whose moderation in the 
hour of triumph is one of the most pleasing incidents of this 
historic scene. Burgoyne completed the formality of surren- 
der by the tender of his sword. 

The total force surrendered, as appears by the official re- 
turn, signed by General Burgoyne, and preserved among the 
Gates papers in the New York Historical Society, was 5,791, 
of which 3,379 were English and provincials and 2,412 Ger- 
man auxiliaries, together with a train of artillery of twenty- 
seven pieces. 

The strength of the American army, rank and file, at Sar- 
atoga on the day of surrender, appears from the same doc- 
ume'nts to have been 11,098, of which 7,716 of the Continen- 
tal line [regulars], and 3,382 militia. In reviewing the 
whole campaign it will be observed how little real reliance 
could be placed on the militia, whose short terms of service 
were a source of perpetual anxiety to the General in com- 
mand. No better or more appropriate illustration of this can 
be given than the action of the militia of the Hampshire 
Grants, whom General Gates had ordei?ed to his support. 
The arrival in camp, on the i8th September, of these victors 
of Bennington, under General Stark, the hero of that battle, 
animated the whole army, who were aware that they were on 
the eve of an engagement, but to the mortification and disgust 
of Gates, their term of Service expiring the same day, they 
marched home from the camp without unpacking their bag- 
gage, and as Wilkinson asserts, without any effort to induce 



RESULTS OF THE VICTORY. 43 

them to remain on the part of their officers. It is not to be 
denied that the mihtia did occasional noteworthy service, but 
the brunt of the engagements fell upon the regular Continen- 
tal troops, who before the close of the war became in every 
"way the equal of their British foes. 

The series of engagements known as the battle of Saratoga 
has been styled one of the fifteen decisive battles of the world. 
Its consequences were of such vast importance as to entitle it 
to this distinction. The long-cherished plan of the British 
Ministry, pursued through two campaigns with persevering 
obstinacy, was finally defeated. The open alliance of France 
was secured ; the United States of America were recognized 
by the continental powers. The news of the victory spread 
rapidly over the land, carrying joy to the hearts of the 
patriots. Washington viewed it as a signal stroke of Provi- 
dence. Congress voted the thanks of the nation to General 
Gates and his army, and a gold medal was struck and pre- 
sented to him in commemoration of the event. 

The last days of a century are closing upon these memor- 
able scenes. How long will it be ere the government of this 
Empire I^tate shall erect a monument to the gallant men who 
fought and fell upon these fields and here secured her liberty 
and renown ? 



THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN 



AN ADDRESS 



DELIVERED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD 



ONE HUNDREDTH CELEBRATION 



BATTLE OF BEMIS HEIGHTS 



September 19, 1877 



JOHN AUSTIN STEVENS 



NEW YORK 

ANSON I). F. RANDOLPH & COMPANY 

900 Br o adway 

, 1877. 






3^3 



>^ ':m^:''^^:^^y3mm 



> -> :i?>'^:>>>3'^fe 



^-::^ 






^.^ -:-^ 



^•' ^^ ^ >; 












J> 


•5 


> i) 


;> 


]) 


» 


D 


> 


1> 


~j> 


•2 


» 


5 


















-^ ^_ :> 



^.^;S- 





















2>o>^ 









:>> ■ 






3 >> 






:> >>> 



>>:» 






^* > 









7^ '^>^>->0 J^^ 

lll^)r ^^ 

> > 'J >>~y y^ 


















'> -i^^ 









^ 3» • 



3^ 



3 3 

3 3 

>?> 



.2) 

-:3>:> 7 



■«-.lS>- 3ji> ■ 

'':=^ 3X>' ■ 

.^ 7§»- 31> " 

>^^ ^^ - 

^ ,*> j'i '^ 



^3 



■ 3> J 

11^ 



30 7> ,^:3 



2» -i>:Jg» _ 

^' 73K> _7 



